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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
) 
COMMERCE FINANCIAL, 
Respondent/Plaintiff 
v. 
BADI M. MAHMOOD, 
Appellant/Defendant 
) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION: 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction of this 
matter by virtue of Article VIII, Section I, Constitution of 
Utah; 78-2a-3, U.C.A.; Rule 3(a) Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW: 
An action was filed in the Third District Court in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, wherein Commerce sought a 
judgment against the appellant, Mr. Mahmood, for a deficiency 
owing under a trust deed note. The matter was tried to the 
court without a jury, the honorable Raymond S. Uno presiding. 
A Memorandum Decison was rendered by the court (R. 138) wherein 
a judgment was granted in favor of the respondent. 
A Motion for Clarification of the Memorandum Decision was 
filed by the respondent (R.148), and under an Order Modifying 
Memorandum Decision (R. 158) the court granted respondent's motion. 
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Thereafter the appellant filed an Objection to Proposed 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment (R. 164) as 
well as a Motion to Amend Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Judgment (R. 168), Respondent filed a reply to the appellant's 
motion and objection (R. 170), and under a Minute Entry ruling 
the court denied the appellant's motion and objection. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 178) and 
Judgment (R. 185) were entered by the court, as was an Order (R.187) 
denying appellant's objections to the proposed Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment. A Notice of Appeal was filed by 
the appellant on November 22, 19 89 with the Third District Court. 
(R. 189) . 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW: 
(1) What is the correct value and amount of the credit 
due to the appellant in accordance with the court's decision? 
(2) How should that credit be applied towards the balance 
deemed to be due at the time the property was sold? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE: 
(A) NATURE OF THE CASE: 
This is an appeal from a final "Judgment" and "Order" 
by the Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County, Utah. 
(B) COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, DISPOSITION AND RELEVANT FACTS: 
1. It should be stated at the outset that no transcript of 
the proceedings has been ordered since the issues revolve around 
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the documents and pleadings in the record and the manner in which 
the court has applied its own ruling. 
2. On or about April 5, 1983, appellant entered into a loan 
transaction with plaintiff whereby respondent provided to 
Mahmood the principal sum of $48,662.56. (R.179) 
3. As a part of the loan transaction, Mahmood executed 
certain documents in favor of the plaintiff including a Deed of 
Trust. The Deed of Trust was recorded in the Salt Lake County 
Recorder's Office on May 13, 1983, which Deed of Trust was 
related to real property located in Salt Lake City, Utah and 
which Deed of Trust conveyed to Commerce a second position in 
and to said property. (R.179). 
4. On or about January 3, 1984, the loan was renewed and 
plaintiff Commerce provided to Mahmood the principal sum of 
$48,958.02. (R. 179) 
5. On or about September 7, 1984, a notice of default 
containing an election to sell was recorded by Valley Title 
Company as trustee under a certain trust deed on the subject 
property recorded in the office of the Salt Lake County Recorder, 
which trust deed was subsequently assigned to Gate City Federal 
Savings and Loan Association. Gate City held a first lien position 
by virtue of this trust deed. (R. 180) 
6. On January 3, 1985, Valley Title Company conducted a 
trustee's sale of the subject property, at which time Commerce 
appeared and purchased the property and acquired title thereto 
for the sum of $110,395.11 as the highest bidder at the sale, which 
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sum was paid to Valley Title company for the use and benefit 
of Gate City. (R. 180) 
7. After satisfaction of the underlying indebtedness of 
$109,975.88 secured by the Gate City trust deed, there remainded a 
balance of $419.23 which was applied to reduce the balance remaining 
unpaid on Mahmood's promissory note. (R. 180) 
8. There was due and owing to Commerce on the date of said 
trustee's sale, January 3, 19 85, on Mahmood's promissory note, the 
sum of $57, 398.35 together with accruing interest. (R. 180) 
9. On or about March 8, 1985, Commerce sold the subject 
property to Jay Craig Smith and Nancy Smith for a total sales price 
of $140,000.00. (R. 180) 
10. The subject property had a fair market value on 
the date of January 3, 1985, of $160,000.00. (R. 181, 140) 
11. On July 12, 1985, Commerce filed a Complaint in the 
Third District Court against Mahmood (R. 3) wherein Commerce 
alleged many of the above facts, including the note between 
the parties valued at the time of renewal at $48,968.02, plus 
interest and attorney's fees leaving a balance due and claimed 
of $57,398.35; that the above said trustee's sale had been 
conducted; and that the above said amount had been bid. (R. 4) 
By virtue of these facts Commerce claimed a deficiency under the 
note with Mahmood of $57,39 8.3 5 and demanded judgment for said 
amount. (R. 4) 
12. In Mahmood's Answer to the Complaint he raised the 
affirmative defense that the actual value of the property far 
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exceeded the amount bid at the sale, that by virtue of the 
plaintiff having purchased the property it had been compensated 
in full, and that no deficiency should be allowed given the 
great disparity between true value and the amount bid. (R. 10) 
13. Subsequently, in connection with Commerce's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, and in Mahmood's trial memorandum (R. 39-41 
and R. 96-98 respectively) Mahmood raised the defense that prior 
to the trustee's sale conducted on January 3, 19 85, he had 
entered into negotiations to refinance the property in question 
and discharge both the first and second trust deeds. He claimed 
that in the course of these negotiations Commerce represented to 
Mahmood that Commerce would acquire the first note and deed of 
trust and would, thereafter, combine the total obligations of the 
first and second notes and deeds of trust in a single obligation 
and allow Mahmood a period of time of approximately three (3) 
years to either effect a sale of the property or structure 
refinancing which would, in either event, satisfy and retire the 
total obligations evidence by the first and second deeds of trust. 
14. Mahmood further contended that he was instructed by 
Commerce not to appear at the trustee's sale conducted by the 
first deed of trust holder for the reason that his interest would 
be protected by Commerce. (R. 97) 
15. At the trial held on the 14th of February, 19 89, 
these and other defenses raised by Mahmood were considered by the 
court, as set forth in the court's Memorandum Decision. (R. 138) 
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16. In the court's Memorandum Decision (R. 139-140) the 
court rejected the contention of appellant that Commerce said it 
would purchase the property and negotiate a settlement with him, 
but the court apparently did feel that as a matter of equity the 
appellant Mahmood was entitled to the value of the property over 
and above the purchase price at the trustee's sale. (R. 139-140) 
In so doing the court affixed a value upon the property of 
$160,000.00. (R. 140) 
17. The respondent Commerce then filed a Motion for 
Clarification and Request for Oral Argument with the court. (R. 
14 8) In that motion Commerce claimed (1) the judgment amount 
was in error in that the figure given by the court was not 
introduced into evidence by either party and basically was the 
amount due as of the date of the trustee's sale without accrued 
interest to the date of trial and did not represent the entire 
amount due as of the date of trial; and (2) that the court should 
not apply the fair market value of the property as a credit towards 
the amount due. (R. 142) An accompanying schedule was 
attached. (R. 152) 
18. The court agreed that the figure used had been in 
error and by order modified the Memorandum Decision. (R. 158). 
However, the court failed to address the other issue concerning 
giving a credit towards the amount in the value of the property. 
(R. 158-159) 
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19. Commerce then submitted to the court proposed Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment. Mahmood filed an 
objection to the proposed findings, conclusions and judgment 
(R. 164) and a Motion to Amend Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Judgment. (R. 16 8) 
20. As part of Mahmoodfs arguments to the court he 
argued that the court had failed to give him proper credit towards 
the amount due by him in light of the findindgs that the property 
had a value of $160,000.00 and that as a matter of equity he was 
entitled to credit for that value. (R. 164) He argued furthermore 
that by the court making a finding of a credit it had in effect 
found that Commerce would be unjustly enriched and a finding to 
the contrary was in error. (R. 164) 
21. Without elaboration the court subsequently denied 
Mahmood1s motion to amend the findings and judgment. (R. 177, 187.) 
22. Mahmood then filed his Notice of Appeal. (R. 189) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS: 
(A) WHAT IS THE VALUE OF THE CREDIT DUE MAHMOOD?: 
From the court's Memorandum Decision it is apparent that the court 
felt that as a matter of equity Mahmood should be given credit 
for the value of the property above and beyond a certain figure. 
That is why the court made a finding of the value of the property. 
It is Mahmoodfs contention that the value of the credit is the 
difference between the the payoff figure to Gate City Mortgage and 
the value of the property determined by the court, and not the 
difference between the value of the property and the sales price 
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for which Commerce sold the property. 
(B) HOW SHOULD THE CREDIT BE APPLIED?: The credit should 
be applied towards the difference between the Gate City Mortgage 
and the balance due by Mahmood on his promissory note. No 
consideration should be given to the sales price for which 
Commerce sold the property. 
(C) WAS THERE UNJUST ENRICHMENT TO COMMERCE?: The court 
has seemed to indicate that Mahmood is entitled to a credit 
towards his balance due Commerce as a matter of equity. Is such 
a finding in conflict with the court's ruling that there has been 
no unjust enrichment in favor of Commerce? We submit that two 
such findings are inconsistent and contradictory. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: 
THE APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO A CREDIT TOWARDS THE JUDGMENT 
AMOUNT DUE THE RESPONDENT AND THE VALUE OF THAT CREDIT 
IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE MARKET VALUE OF THE PROPERTY 
AND THE AMOUNT PAID BY COMMERCE TO GATE CITY MORTGAGE. 
It is undisputed that Mahmood renewed his loan with Commerce 
on January 3, 1984 in the principal sum of $48,968.02. It is 
undisputed that at the time the trustee for the first trust deed 
holder conducted its trustee's sale Commerce appeared and purchased 
the property for $110,395.11 as the highest bidder. Other arguments 
aside, it is undisputed for purposes of this appeal that after 
crediting Mahmood!s account with the excess received from the 
trusteefs sale the amount due on his promissory note to Commerce 
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was $57,398.35. (R. 180) It is also undisputed that the property 
in question had a fair market value of $160,000.00 as of the 
date of the trustee's sale. (R. 140, 181) It is at this point 
that the parties diverge in their opinions as to the application 
of these facts. One of these points is>the value of the credit. 
From the court's Memorandum Decision (R. 138) it is not 
entirely clear what the court is attempting to do. At R. 139 
the court notes that "defendant, during his testimony, made a 
very strong and persuasive argument that defendant [sic: plaintiff] 
would negotiate a settlement with him and told him not to appear 
at the trustees sale conducted by the first deed of trust holder 
and defendant's interest would be protected." Whether it is 
the court's concern about the possibility that such an event may 
have transpired (although the court did reject Mahmood's argument), 
or whether the court was concerned about Commerce receiving a 
windfall at Mahmood's expense, it is apparent that the court 
felt it appropriate to fix the value of the property and give the 
appellant a credit as a matter of equity. (R. 140, R. 181, paragraphs 
16 and 18.) 
Where we feel error lies is with the valuation of the 
credit at $20,000.00. There is no basis for such a finding 
when one carefully examines the facts. The point at which we 
believe the court becomes confused is where Commerce sold the 
subject property to another party for the sum of $140,000.00. It 
is apparently from this figure that the court derives the $20,000.00 
figure, i.e., $160,000 less $140,000 equals $20,000. But what is 
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th e point in using the third party sales price of $140,000? We 
submit that there is none. 
If one is to make any sense at all out of the purpose in 
afixing a value upon the property, regardless of the amount, it 
must be to determine the amount to which Commerce has benefited. 
By acquiring property valued at $160,000, the value of Commerce's 
benefit must be the difference between this figure and the amount 
it paid to Gate City Mortgage. It is immaterial what they may 
later sell the property for to a third party. What is material is 
that they have been benefited in an amount equal to the difference 
between what they paid for the property and what the value was of 
the property received. The fact that Commerce sold the property 
for a figure substantially below the fair market value fixed by 
the court should not result in the difference being due by Mahmood. 
If Commerce had sold the property for a figure above $160,000 
would they feel Mahmood was entitled to receive payment in cash 
for the difference? Of course not. If the court had valued the 
property below the $140,000 sales price would they be willing to 
refund the difference to Mahmood? Certainly not. Why then should 
the sales price of $140,0 00 have any impact upon the amount due 
by Mahmood? We submit that it should not. 
Furthermore, we draw the court's attention to the fact that 
the court below made its determinations of value and balance due 
on the note to Commerce as of the date of the trustee's sale of 
January 3, 1985. It did not use the subsequent sales date of 
of the property. It must therefore be January 3, 19 85 at which 
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time the value of property, balances and credits must be affixed. 
A subsequent sales price can have no bearing upon the amount due 
by Mahmood, nor can it affect the value received by Commerce in 
acquiring the property in January of 1985. In addition, if the 
subsequent sales price is to be considered in determining the 
balance due by Mahmood then he is entitled to have Commerce show 
that the property was sold for its fair market value as that term 
is defined by the courts of this state. [See Redevelopment Agency 
Salt Lake City v. Barrutia, 526 P2d 47 at 49 (Utah, 1974] But 
even that may be of no value. 
It is readily apparent that if the property had been sold 
at or closer to the fair market value of the property then under 
the respondent's theory of the credit the credit to Mahmood would 
have been reduced. For example, if the property had sold for 
$155,000 then one must assume that Commerce would argue that 
Mahmood is only entitled to a $5,000 credit. The more Commerce 
gets out of the sale the more it gets out of Mahmood. This is 
clearly contrary to the equitable requirement that a party 
mitigage its damages against another party. [See Alexander v. 
Brown, 646 P2d 692 (Utah, 1982); Utah Farm Production Credit 
Assn. v. Cox, 627 P2d 62 (Utah 1981)] But what result do we 
have if Commerce sold the property for less, thus increasing the 
difference betv/een their sales price and the value of the property? 
Does the credit due Mahmood then increase? Under such circumstances 
there is no incentive for Commerce to sell the property for the 
fair market value. 
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From the foregoing it is apparent that when one tries 
to reconcile the court's effort to affix an equitable amount with 
the sales price of $140,000 one only confronts endless paradoxes. 
The only solution therefore is to give Mahmood a credit for 
the difference between the purchase price at the trustee's sale 
and the value of the property determined by the court. The 
constant contradictions one confronts otherwise renders the entire 
situation unworkable. It is apparent that the court was attempting 
to provide an equitable solution by allowing Mahmood a credit 
for the value between the sales price to the trustee and the value 
of the property. To inject the subsequent sales price into the 
equation only muddies the water and renders the court's efforts 
at equitable relief futile. We therefore submit that the correct 
credit is the difference between $160,000 and the amount of the 
underlying indebtedness of $109,975.88, to-wit: $50,024.12. 
POINT II: 
HAVING ARGUED FOR A CREDIT AS SET FORTH IN POINT I, THAT 
CREDIT SHOULD BE APPLIED AS SET FORTH HEREINBELOW. 
An analysis of the respondent's own testimony and 
exhibits conclusively establish that the maximum sums to which 
Commerce would be entitled are as follows: 
(a) $109,975.88 paid to Gate City Mortgage for first Deed 
of Trust. (Finding No. 8, R. 180) 
(b) Balance due on promissory note to Commerce: $57,398.35. 
(Finding No. 9, R. 180) 
(c) Accrued interest on Commerce's note to September 12, 
1989, by calculations reflected by Judgment: $10,375.65. 
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(d) Attorney's fees awarded by court: $3,000.00. 
(e) Costs incurred by Commerce: $141.50. 
Total sum due Commerce per their calculations and the 
Findings and Judgment is $180,891.38. 
LESS: 
(a) Fair market value of property on date of Trustee's 
sale as determined by court: $160,000.00. 
Balance due Commerce as of September 12, 1989, including 
all interest, costs and attorney's fees to date: $20,891.38. 
Given the above we submit that the amount due Commerce 
as of the date of September 12, 1989 is $20,891.38, giving the 
appellant due credit for the fair market value of the property 
and ignoring the injection into the equation of the confusing 
sales price to a third party. 
POINT III: 
THE COURT'S AWARD OF EQUITABLE RELIEF CONFLICTS WITH ITS 
FINDING OF THERE BEING NO UNJUST ENRICHMENT TO COMMERCE 
We submit that on the face of matters any finding by the 
court that the appellant is entitled to a credit as a matter of 
equity conflicts directly with its finding that there has been 
no unjust enrichment to Commerce. If need be, therefore, such 
a finding should be stricken and the equitable credit due Mahmood 
should be based upon a finding of unjust enrichment to Commerce. 
CONCLUSION 
We submit that it is quite clear, and undisputed, that the 
court below was attempting to award Mahmood a credit for the 
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excess value received by Commerce. The issue is an excess 
over and above what figure. By our arguments above attempting 
to use the $140,000 figure results in all kinds of contradictions 
and does not render a logical conclusion and result. The only 
logical method of dealing with the credit is to give Mahmood a 
credit for the difference between the fair market value affixed 
by the court and the purchase price paid to the first trust deed 
holder. It is clear that by doing so Commerce is made whole, which 
we submit was the intent of the court by attempting to award a 
credit. To inject into the formula a subsequent sales figure, 
which postdated the values for the property and the purchase price, 
only causes confusion and the creation of a plethora of 
paradoxical justifications for such a theory. We therefore 
request that the court award a credit as computed in Point II 
hereinabove. 
DATED this day of , 1990. 
BRANT H. WALL 
WALL & WALL 
Attorneys for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that 4 ttue and correct copies of the 
Appellant's Brief on Appeal were mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Don E. Olsen, attorney for respondent, 648 E. 100 South, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, 84102, on the day of , 1990. 
GREGORY B. WALL 
ADDENDUM 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
COMMERCE FINANCIAL, : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, : CIVIL NO. C-85-4542 
vs. : 
BADI MAHMOOD, : 
Defendant. : 
This matter came on regularly for trial on the 14th day of 
February, 1989. The plaintiff being present and represented by 
its counsel Don E. Olsen and defendant being present and 
represented by his counsel Brant H. Wall. Sworn testimony was 
taken, evidence introduced, closing arguments made and the matter 
submitted. The Court took the case under advisement. The Court 
now being fully advised, makes and enters its Memorandum 
Decision. 
The Court finds that plaintiff's purchase of the property at 
the first trust deed foreclosure sale did not effect a merger of 
title extinguishing defendant's obligations, nor did it 
constitute payment in full of defendant's obligation, nor did it 
constitute a redemption for the use and benefit of defendant. 
The Court further finds plaintiff's claim is not barred by 
failure to comply with the provisions of the Utah Code relating 
COMM. FINAN. V. MAHMOOD PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
to trust deed foreclosure, and further, defendant is not entitled 
to relief and punitive damages. 
The two issues which presented the Court with difficulty 
were: (1) Did plaintiff represent to defendant it would acquire 
the first note and deed of trust; combine the first and second 
notes and deeds of trust into a single debt and secure the same 
with a single deed of trust on the subject property; and allow 
defendant up to three years for repayment at 10% interest? (2) 
What was the actual cash value of the property at 3449 East Loren 
Von Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah on January 3, 1985 and around the 
first of the year of 1986, when the property was sold to Craig 
Smith? 
The Court does not consider other defenses of any merit and 
therefore dismisses them without further discussion. 
Defendant, during his testimony, made a very strong and 
persuasive argument that defendant would negotiate a settlement 
with him and told him not to appear at the trustees sale 
conducted by the first deed of trust holder and defendant's 
interest would be protected. However, after weighing all of the 
testimony and evidence, the Court is of the opinion and so finds 
the evidence does not support defendant's contention. 
In regards to the cash value of the property at 3449 East 
Loren Von Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, on January 3, 1985 and 
around the first of the year of 1986, when the property was sold 
COMM. FINAN. V, MAHMOOD PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
to Craig Smith, it is the opinion of the Court and the Court so 
finds the value of the property was in excess of $140,000.00, but 
did not exceed $180,000.00. Based on the testimony and evidence 
introduced, the Court finds the value of the property to be 
$160,000.00. 
The plaintiff is awarded Judgment in the sum of $57,398.35 
minus $20,000.00, or $37,398.35, plus interest at 18%, and 
attorney's fees in the sum of $3,000.00, plus costs. 
Dated this __day of February, 1989. 
5 
RAYMOND S. UNO 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
DON E. OLSEN #2460 
MATHESON, MORTENSEN & OLSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
648 East First South 
Salt. Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 363-2244 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
COMMERCE FINANCIAL, 
vs . 
BADI M. MAHMOOD, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
ORDER MODIFYING 
) MEMORANDUM DECISION 
) Civil No. C85-4542 
Judge Raymond S. Uno 
Plaintiff's Motion for Clarification of the Court's 
Memorandum Decision having come on regularly for hearing on 
Monday, Juno 12. 1989 at the hour of 11:45 a.m.; Plaintiff 
appearing by counsel Don E. Olsen and Defendant appearing in 
person and by counsel Brant H. Wall; the Court having heard the 
arguments and statements of counsel for the respective parties, 
plaintiff liaving submitted a schedule of computations as to the 
amount of the judgment, Defendant having requested leave to 
submit his own Schedule of Computations and said leave having 
been granted and Defendant having submitted his Schedule of 
Computations and the Court having taken the matter under 
advisement and now having reviewed the file, the pleadings and 
evidence and having reviewed and considered the arguments of 
counsel and the- respective Schedules of Computation and being 
fully advised in the promises; it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiff's Schedule of 
Computations as to the amount of its judgment is correct and that 
plaintiff is entitled to interest at the rate of 18% per annum 
from the date of the Gate City foreclosure sale on January 3, 
1985 until date of judgment herein on the unpaid principal 
balance due, to-wit: $37,398.35. It is further 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Memorandum Decision 
dated February 24, 1989, previously entered herein be and the 
same is hereby modified in accordance with this order. It is 
further 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiff's counsel 
piepare Findings or Fact, Conclusions of Law and a judgment 
accordingly. 
DATED this day of August, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
Raymond S. Uno 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
n the 1/sC day of / ^ A ^ < ^ Q , 1989, I mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Order Modifying Memorandum 
Decision, postage pre-paid, to: 
Brant H. Wall, Esq. 
WALL & WALL 
Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
DON E. OLSEN #2460 
MATHESON, MORTENSEN & OLSEN 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
COMMERCE FINANCIAL, 
vs. 
BADI M. MAHMOOD, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
I FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
} CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
I Civil No. C85-4542 
> Judge Raymond S. Uno 
The above-captioned matter came on regularly for trial on 
Tuesday and Wednesday, February 14 and 15, 1989, the Honorable 
Raymond S. Uno presiding; plaintiff appeared by its officer John 
R. Woods, Jr. and by counsel Don B. Olsen and defendant Badi M. 
Mahmood appeared in person and by counsel Brant H. Wall; both 
sides having called witnesses and presented evidence and 
testimony and both sides having rested their respective cases, 
the matter having been argued by counsel and the Court having 
heard and considered the evidence and the arguments of counsel 
and having reviewed the file and having taken the matter under 
advisement and having heretofore made and entered its Memorandum 
Decision and plaintiff having moved for clarification of said 
Memorandum Decision and the Court having made and entered its 
Order Modifying said Memorandum Decision and now being fully 
advised in the premises, makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff is a Utah corporation having its principal 
place of business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and 
defendant at the time of commencement of this action was a 
resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. On or about April 5, 1983, Defendant entered into a loan 
transaction with plaintiff whereby plaintiff provided to 
defendant the principal sum of $48,662,56. 
3. As a part of the loan transaction, defendant executed 
certain documents in favor of the plaintiff including a Deed of 
Trust. The Deed of Trust was recorded in the Salt Lake County 
Recorder's Office on May 13, 1983 as Entry No. 3793018, in Book 
5459, at Page 105, which Deed of Trust related to real property 
located at 3449 East Loren Von Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, and 
is more particularly described as follows: 
All of Lot 823, Mount Olympus Hills, No. 8 Subdivision, 
according to the official plat thereof, on file and of 
record in the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office. 
which Deed of Trust conveyed to plaintiff a second position in 
and to said property. 
4. On or about January 3, 1984, the loan was renewed and 
plaintiff provided to defendant the principal sum of $48,968.02. 
5. Subsequent to the execution of the loan documents, the 
defendant defaulted in making the payments due and owing to 
plaintiff on the Note. 
6. On September 7, 1984, a notice of default containing an 
election to sell was recorded by Valley Title Company as trustee 
under a certain trust deed on the subject property recorded in 
the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office on March 31, 1981 as Entry 
No. 3543503, in Book 5224, at Page 710, and subsequently assigned 
to Gate City Federal Savings and Loan Association. Gate City 
Federal Savings and Loan Association was the first lienholder on 
the subject property by virtue of said trust deed. 
7. A trustee's sale of the property was conducted on 
January 3, 1985, by Valley Title Company, at which time plaintiff 
appeared and purchased the property and acquired title thereto 
for the sum of $110,395.11 as the high bidder at the sale, which 
sum was paid to Valley Title Company, for the use and benefit of 
Gate City Federal Savings and Loan Association. 
8. After satisfaction of the underlying indebtedness of 
$109,975.88 secured by the Gate City trust deed, there remained a 
balance of $419.23 which was applied to reduce the balance 
remaining unpaid on defendant's promissory note. 
9. There was due and owing to plaintiff on the date of said 
trustee's sale, January 3, 1985, on defendant's promissory note, 
the sum of $57,398.35 together with accruing interest at the rate 
of 18% per annum before and after judgment. 
10. On or about March 8, 1985, plaintiff sold the subject 
property to Jay Craig Smith and Nancy Smith for the total sale 
price of $140,000.00. 
11. Plaintiff's purchase of the property at the Gate City 
foreclosure sale of its first trust deed did not effect a merger 
of title extinguishing defendant's obligation to plaintiff on his 
promissory note. 
12. Plaintiff's purchase of the property at the Gate City 
foreclosure sale did not constitute payment in full of 
defendant's obligation on his promissory note. 
13. Plaintiff's purchase of the property at the Gate City 
foreclosure sale did not constitute a redemption for the use and 
benefit of plaintiff. 
14. Plaiintiff has in its handling of defendant's obligation, 
complied with all applicable Utah statutes relating to the 
foreclosure of trust deeds. 
15. Plaintiff did not represent to defendant that it would 
acquire the property, combine the first and second trust deed 
obligations and allow defendant additional time for repayment at 
a lower rate of interest. 
16. The actual cash value of the subject property on January 
3, 1985, the date of the Gate City foreclosure sale was the sum 
of $160,000,00. 
17. Defendant's purchase of the subject property at the Gate 
City foreclosure sale and subsequent resale to the Smiths did not 
constitute an unjust enrichment of plaintiff. 
18. As a matter of equity, Defendant is entitled to a credit 
of $20,000.00 toward the balance due on the date of purchase, to-
wit: $57,398.35 which represents the difference between the 
actual cash value of said property on that date and the value 
attributed to the property by plaintiff for which the subject 
property was actually eventually sold, to-wit: $140,000.00. 
19. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to judgment against the 
defendant in the sum of $37,398.35 together with accrued interest 
from and after January 3, 1985 until date of trial at the rate of 
18% per annum in the sum of $27,682.97 and accrued interest at 
the rate of 18% per annum from date of trial until date hereof in 
the sum of $3,633.27. 
20. Defendant agreed as a provision of the notes and trust 
deeds executed by him, to pay all reasonable attorney's fees and 
costs of collection in the event of default and plaintiff's 
reasonable attorney's fees amounted to the sum of $3,000. 
21. Plaintiff is entitled to its costs of court in the sum of 
$141.50. 
22. Plaintiff is entitled to interest on the total of its 
judgment at the agreed rate of 18% per annum from date of entry 
until paid. 
23. Plaintiff's action was brought timely within the terms of 
applicable Utah statute. 
24. Plaintiff's conduct did not breach any fiduciary duty 
owed to defendant nor has plaintiff been unjustly enriched at 
defendant's expense. 
25. Defendant introduced no evidence that plaintiff conspired 
with Gate City Mortgage to deprive defendant of his property or 
otherwise. 
26. Plaintiff was not required to conduct a meaningless 
foreclosure of its second trust deed after the Gate City 
foreclosure of the first trust deed and sale of the property to 
plaintiff, because such first trust deed foreclosure effectively 
foreclosed plaintiff's second trust deed. 
27. No conduct on the part of plaintiff was wanton, willful, 
deliberate nor did it inflict any mental pain or distress upon 
defendant. 
28. Defendant has not established any of his affirmative 
defenses by a preponderance of the evidence. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Defendant has not established any of his affirmative 
defenses by a preponderance of the evidence and plaintiff is 
entitled to a judgment of dismissal of the same. 
2. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against defendant in 
the sum of $37,398.35 together with interest accrued from and 
after January 3, 1985 at the rate of 18% per annum. 3. 
Plaintiff is entitled to judgment for its reasonable attorney's 
fees in the sum of $3,000.00 and its costs of Court in the sum of 
$141.50. 
4. Plaintiff is entitled to interest on the total of its 
judgment at the rate of 18% per annum from date of entry until 
paid. 
DATED this day of September, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
Raymond S. Uno, District Judge 
